AUTOMOBILE CONSENT SEARCHES: THE DRIVER'S
OPTIONS IN A LOSE-LOSE SITUATION
Arthur J. Park*
"Doyou mind if I take a quick look in the vehicle?"
This is a question that countless Americans hear every day, but very few
citizens understand the ramifications of their answer. How long can the
officer keep me here? What if there is something in my car that I do not
know about? Can I be arrested if I refuse the search? This article will
address the legal context surrounding consent searches of automobiles in
order to provide some clarity to drivers and passengers that are put in this
lose-lose situation.
I.

BASIS FOR THE STOP

Traffic stops generally occur in one of three situations: (1) stops based on
probable cause, (2) stops based on reasonable suspicion, and (3) roadblocks.
A quick overview of each type of stop will frame the overall discussion and
highlight the areas of concern associated with automobile consent searches.
A law enforcement officer may pull over a vehicle if he has probable
cause to believe that any offense has occurred.' Probable cause has been
defined as "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in
believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense."2 It is important to note that
* Associate at Brewster, Morhous, Cameron, Caruth, Moore, Kersey & Stafford, PLLC in Bluefield,
West Virginia. J.D., University of Mississippi; B.A., University of Georgia. The author may be
contacted at apark a brewstermorhous.com.
1. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) ("As a general matter, the decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred."). For an excellent, comprehensive analysis of probable cause and other Fourth Amendment
issues, see THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
(Carolina Academic Press 2008).
2. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). However, the Supreme Court has also noted that
"[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules." The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification
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the officer can act whenever any law has been violated.3 Thus, an
individual can be pulled over if he commits a traffic violation of any sort.4
This is true even though "the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely
regulated that total compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly
impossible" and despite the fact that "a police officer will almost invariably
be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation." 5 Accordingly,
an officer has the authority to follow an individual for as long as it takes
for
6
the driver to commit a traffic violation, and thus create probable cause.
An officer may also pull over a vehicle based on articulable suspicion
that any offense has been committed] Articulable suspicion, also known as
reasonable suspicion, is defined as "a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." 8 The
reasonable suspicion standard is somewhat less demanding than probable
cause: "a policeman who lacks probable cause but whose 'observations lead
him reasonably to suspect' that a particular person has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in
order to 'investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion."' 9 The
articulable suspicion standard was announced in Terry v. Ohio0 and has
since been applied to traffic stops, because "most traffic stops resemble, in
duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry."' '
For example, articulable suspicion likely exists when an officer believes,
but is not positive, that a vehicle's windows are too tinted or its registration
tags are expired.

into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the
circumstances.
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
3. DeFillippo,443 U.S. at 37.
4. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (seat belt violation).
5. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
6. See id. at 808 (officer believed driver possessed drugs but pulled over the driver for failing to signal a
turn); United States v. Herring, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1254 (D. Or. 1999) (officer followed gang-related
shooting suspect for thirty blocks before suspect made an illegal lane change).
7. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that "in justifying the particular intrusion the police
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion").
8. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981).
9. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (quoting Unites States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 881 (1975)).
10. 392 U.S. at 21.
11. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 n.29; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 786 (2009) (upholding
traffic stop that was justified by suspicion "reasonably grounded, but short of probable cause").
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The third general basis for a traffic stop is a roadblock. Any police2
roadblock constitutes a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, the permissive use of roadblocks will be judged on the basis of
reasonableness. 3 However, the Supreme Court has prohibited roadblocks
established "primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes,"
such as narcotics or firearms. 14

II.

CONSENT SEARCHES 1N GENERAL

Unlike many other rights, 5 an individual does not have to be aware of
his right to refuse consent before "waiving" it. 6 Practically speaking, this
means that an officer seeking consent to search the vehicle is not required to
advise the driver that he may lawfully refuse consent. 17 In Schneckloth v.
Bustamnonte, the Court cited three reasons for this rule: (1) the police have a
"legitimate need" for consent searches,18 (2) a consent search "may result in
considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search,"' 9 and (3)
"the community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting
search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of
crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not
wrongly charged with a criminal offense. 20
Critics of Schneckloth argue that regular citizens are unaware of their
right to refuse consent, and consequently, they give consent in the vast

12. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) ("It is agreed that checkpoint stops are
Iseizures' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
13. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoint);
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979).
14. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (holding roadblock set up to inquire about
narcotics and firearms invalid). In addition, the Supreme Court has prohibited random, suspicionless
stops commenced solely for the purpose of checking licenses and registrations. See Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) ("This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court
has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be
circumscribed, at least to some extent.").
15. Such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
339-40 (1963) (holding counsel must be provided for defendant unless he waives that right); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that after the defendant is informed of his right to silence,
he may then waive his right).
16. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). However, a few states, under their own state
constitution, require that the driver must possess knowledge of the ability to refuse consent and that the
officer must have reasonable suspicion of a more serious offense. See, e.g., State v. Carty, 790 A.2d
905, 907 (N.J. 2002). For more on independent state grounds, see infra Part V.A.
17. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234.
18. Id. at 227.
19. Id. at 228.
20. Id. at 243. However, one could certainly argue that the community also has a "real interest" in
preventing the police from performing baseless consent searches at the end of every traffic stop.
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majority of situations, even when the individuals know that there is
incriminating evidence in the car. 2' There is some empirical data to support
this claim. Approximately 90% of all searches conducted by the police are
consensual in nature. 22 Professor Marcy Strauss notes that "most people
would not feel free to deny a request by a police officer. '23 Further, the
likelihood of compliance increases "when the authority figure has visible
trappings of authority, such as a uniform. 24 Justice Stevens has aptly
opined that "[rlepeated decisions by ordinary citizens to surrender that
[privacy] interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis
other
' 25
than an assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do so.
Consent is valid when voluntarily given, and the courts consider the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether consent is, in fact,
voluntary. 26 The Schneckloth Court listed a number of factors that may be
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances, including
the youth of the accused, his lack of education, his low intelligence, the lack of
any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention,
the repeated and prolonged nature of the questionin , and the use of physical
punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.

It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to state that the
individual does not have the right to refuse consent. 28 Further, consent
cannot be coerced "by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or
covert force," including "subtly coercive police questions., 29 However, an
officer's "threat" to return with a search warrant if the individual refused
consent has been upheld as not coercive. 30 Applying that logic, an officer
could threaten to call in a drug dog unit or to arrest the driver (assuming the
officer has probable cause for an arrest) if the individual refuses to give
consent to a search of the vehicle.

21. Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" But Still Reasonable: A Aewt Paradigmfor Understanding the
Consent Search Doctrine, 80 IND. L. J. 773, 800 01 (2005).
22. Id. at 773.
23. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMTNOLOGY 211,236 (2002).
24. Id. (citing Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 47
(1974)).
25. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 48 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 40 (majority opinion) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49).
27. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citations omitted).
28. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). The Court went on to state that "[w]here
there is coercion there cannot be consent." Id.
29. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 29.
30. People v. Yuruckso, 746 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
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III.

WHEN CONSENT IS REFUSED

An individual has the constitutional right to refuse consent. 31 The
driver's exercise of that right "may not later be used to implicate guilt" and
"cannot form the basis of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 32
However, a nervous demeanor, in responding to police questioning or in
stating the refusal of consent, can be a factor in establishing reasonable

suspicion.33 A driver who refuses to consent to a search of his vehicle
opens himself up to a smorgasbord of unappealing possibilities: further
questioning by the officer, a long delay in waiting for a canine drug sniff, or
perhaps an arrest for the underlying offense.
A. Further Questioning
Upon a lawful stop, the police officer may ask questions related to the
traffic offense.34 Applying Terry, the officer may ask "pertinent questions"
to the individual during the traffic stop. 35 The Supreme Court has also
found that "[a]sking questions is an essential part of police
investigations. 36 In Muehler v. Mena, the Court held that an officer did not
need reasonable suspicion to inquire about an individual's "name, date and
place of birth, or immigration status. '3

However, the Court recently

clarified that "inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the
traffic stop.., do not convert the encounter into something other than a
lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the
duration of the stop.",31 It remains to be seen how the lower courts will use
the "measurably extend, 39 test in light of the fact that "an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. ' 40 In short, a driver who refuses consent

31. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
32. Longshore v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1159 (Md. 2007).
33. See United States v. Vargas, 57 Fed. Appx. 394, 400 (10th Cir. 2003).
34. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
439 (1984) ('[T]he officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his
identity and to tryto obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions.").
35. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
36. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at185.
37. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005). Since "mere police questioning does not constitute a
seizure," the issue becomes whether the questioning unreasonably prolonged the detention. Id.
38. Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009) (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
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may very well be asked a series of questions that are either related or
unrelated to the offense at hand, and such questioning appears to be lawful
so long as it does not measurably extend the duration of the stop.
B. Canine Drug Sniffs
Surprisingly, the use of a drug detection dog does not constitute a
"search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 41 Thus, an officer does
not need probable cause or reasonable suspicion before utilizing a drug
dog. 42 In United States v. Place, the Supreme Court reasoned that a dog
sniff is not a search, because it does not expose the property to public view,
is "less intrusive than a typical search," and "discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics.' 3 The Court has further upheld the use of a drug dog
to sniff the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle.44 In Illinois v. Caballes,
the Court allowed a dog sniff of the driver's vehicle, even though the dog
sniff was not conducted by the same officer who had made the initial traffic
stop. 45 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit has stated the following reasons for
upholding dog sniffs in the traffic context: (1) the dog sniffs occur only
outside of the vehicle; (2) the driver does not experience any
embarrassment or inconvenience by the transaction; (3) dog sniffs do not
cause an unreasonable delay; and (4) the driver does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the air emanating from the exterior of his
vehicle 4. 6
Although the use of a narcotics detection dog is not a search, an
unreasonably prolonged traffic stop for the drug dog to arrive or perform
the sniff may constitute a seizure. In Place, the Court noted that "the
brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an
important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally
intrusive as to be justifiable,, 47 and in Caballes, the Supreme Court's ruling
relied on the fact that the traffic stop was not extended beyond the time

41. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). "[E]xposure of respondent's luggage, which was
located in a public place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Id.
42. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
43. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
44. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
45. Id. at 406.
46. United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 1990). But see infra notes 124-27
and accompanying text regarding the Court's recent validation of the driver's reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle generally.
47. Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
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necessary to issue a citation.48 Thus, courts will likely first look to the
length of the detention in determining whether to uphold a dog sniff during
a traffic stop. Courts have upheld dog sniffs that resulted in a delay of only
a few minutes, 49 ten minutes, 5° and thirty minutes. 5 1 Although the Place
Court declined "to adopt any outside time limitation for a permissible Terry
stop, '52 it nevertheless stated that "in assessing the effect of the length of
the detention, we take into account whether the police diligently pursue
their investigation. 53 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has upheld a dog sniff
that resulted in a three-hour delay for the driver, relying on the remote
location of the vehicle and the fact that "the officers acted with diligence
and pursued the quickest and least intrusive means of investigation
reasonably available to confirm or dispel" their reasonable suspicion of
drug trafficking. 4
Courts have disapproved the following dog sniffs: (1) waiting on the
drug dog for ninety minutes because the police did not act diligently,55 (2)
calling for a second drug dog after the first dog failed to signal,56 and (3)
after completing an oral warning to the driver and thus concluding the
traffic stop, conducting the dog sniff absent reasonable suspicion or
consent. 7
Although a three-hour wait is certainly an uncommon
occurrence, a driver that refuses consent could face a significant delay in
waiting for a drug dog to be called in.

48. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406. The Caballes Court explained that
A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver
can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
that mission .... We may assume that a similar result would be warranted in this case if
the dog sniff had been conducted while respondent was being unlawfully detained.
Id. at 407-08 (citation omitted).
49. United States v. Burris, 78 Fed. Appx. 525, 528 (6th Cir. 2003).
50. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406; United States v. Hare, 932 F. Supp. 843, 847 49 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
51. United States v. Brown, 24 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1994).
52. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).
53. Id.
54. United States v. Maltais, 403 F.3d 550, 558 (8th Cir. 2005).
55. Place, 462 U.S. at 709 10.
56. United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2005) (waiting approximately thirty
minutes for first drug dog was reasonable, but waiting an hour for second dog was not).
57. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047 (D. Neb. 1998); see also United States v.
Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1135 36 (8th Cir. 1998) (officer threatened to call in drug dog after telling driver
that he was free to go). For more on what actions the officer can take after giving a warning or citation,
see infra Part III.D.
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C. Arrest
The driver's refusal to give consent "may not later be used to implicate
guilt" and "cannot form the basis of reasonable suspicion or probable
cause." 58 However, an officer already has authority to arrest the driver for
any offense, even a minor traffic violation. 59 The Supreme Court has stated
that when "an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender., 60 The Court
noted that although a citation is given in the vast majority of cases, the
applicable state statute authorized the officer to arrest the driver for a simple
seatbelt violation.61
A similar conclusion may be reached even if the officer does not have
statutory discretion to arrest. 62 Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer
may arrest when he has probable cause to believe that any criminal offense
has occurred, regardless of whether the applicable state statute requires that
only a citation be given.63 In Virginia v. Moore, the arrest for driving with a
suspended license was held to not violate the Fourth Amendment despite a
Virginia law requiring the officer to issue a summons (and not perform an
arrest) for such violations.64 The Court reasoned that local statutes cannot
control the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 65 The officer in Moore had
probable cause to believe that an offense had occurred, and therefore, the
arrest was constitutionally permissible.66 In short, the litmus paper test for
an arrest is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense is occurring or
has occurred. With this test in mind, a driver who refuses consent runs the
risk of arrest for the underlying criminal action, given that the officer has a
large degree of discretion.
After a traffic-based arrest, the individual is inevitably taken to jail, and
the car is thus temporarily left behind. To protect the personal property of
the defendant, the police are authorized to tow the vehicle to a safe area,

58. Longshore v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1159 (Md. 2007).
59. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
60. Id. at 354.
61. Id. at 323; see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (valid arrest for driving
without a license).
62. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
63. Id. at 176 ("We conclude that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an
arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that while States are free to regulate such
arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections.").
64. Id. at 167 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (2004)).
65. Id. at 175 76.
66. Id. at 176.
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such as a police impound lot. 67 Once the car is there, the police may
68
perform an inventory search of the entire vehicle, including all containers.
By making the arrest and performing the subsequent inventory search of the
vehicle, the officer can thus circumvent the consent issue.

D. If the Officer Has Already Issued a Citation or Warning
Once the officer has issued a verbal warning or written citation to the
driver, the purpose of the traffic stop has been accomplished, and, in
general, the officer's ability to detain the individual has ended. 69 The Court
has stated that a "seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond
the time reasonably required to complete that mission."70 However, the
purpose of the traffic stop is not accomplished until the warning or citation
has actually been given to the driver. 7 1 For example, one court held that a
traffic stop was still ongoing when the officer had written, but not yet
handed, the citation to the driver while the computer check was in
72
progress.
After issuing the warning or citation, the officer may further detain the
vehicle only if (1) he has reasonable suspicion of a more serious offense, or
(2) the traffic stop has shifted into a consensual encounter.73 As to
consensual encounters, the officer in Ohio v. Robinette74 completed his
verbal warning for speeding and, on his way back to the car, he asked, "One
question before you get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in
your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?, 75 In
upholding the subsequent consent search, the Court held that the officer was

67. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1987).
68. Id. There are three primary justifications for allowing inventory searches: "to protect an owner's
property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized
property, and to guard the police from danger." Id. at 372.
69. "The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for
the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the
scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave." Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781,
788 (2009).

70. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
71. See United States v. Singh, 363 F.3d 347, 356 (4th Cir. 2004) (once an officer issues a warning or
citation and returns the driver's license and registration, the driver may proceed without further delay).
72. See Byndloss v. State, 893 A.2d 1119, 1125, 1129 (Md. 2006) (while waiting for the computer to
run a background check on the driver's license and registration, the drug dog alerted officers to the
presence of narcotics in the vehicle).
73. See United States. v. Sanchez, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2005); United States v.
Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (D. Kan. 2003).

74. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
75. Id. at 35 36 (citation omitted) (the subsequent consent search revealed drugs).
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not required to advise the driver that the encounter was over and the driver
was "free to go" before seeking consent to search. 76 In another case, the
traffic stop was properly converted into a consensual encounter when, after
receiving his identification from the officer and being told he was free to
go, the defendant asked the officer for directions. 7 Thus, the driver may
still be subject to lawful delays even after the officer has issued the citation
or warning.
IV. WHEN CONSENT

Is

GIVEN

Faced with the disconcerting possibilities of further questioning, waiting
for a drug dog, or being arrested, it is not surprising that the vast majority of
individuals give consent for the police to search their vehicles. Many
individuals make their decisions based on feelings that they have nothing to
hide or that they will look guilty if they refuse.
Who can give consent to search the vehicle? The general rule is that the
owner or driver of the vehicle, not a passenger, can consent to a search of
the car.7' This rule may seem easy to apply, but multiple variations quickly
arise. For example, some courts hold that an officer can obtain consent to
search the vehicle from the registered owner without seeking permission
from the driver.
Other courts reach the seemingly contrary conclusion
that an officer can obtain consent to search the vehicle from the driver and
does not have to seek permission from the owner, even where the owner is
present as a passenger. 80 Reasoning that common authority to consent
arises from mutual use of the property to be searched, at least one court has
held that even the passenger can grant permission to search the vehicle, so
long as the owner is not present. 8'
What if the occupants of the vehicle disagree, in which case one
occupant consents but the other refuses? At least when it comes to a
dwelling, the consent of one co-tenant cannot override the express refusal of
another co-tenant.12 However, this holding was based on the co-tenants

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 36.
United States v. Munoz-Villalba, 251 Fed. Appx. 90, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2007).
68 Am. Jur. 2d SEARCHES & SEIZURES § 164 (2010).
See, e.g., Flores v. State, 194 S.W.3d 207, 212 (Ark. Ct.App. 2004).
See, e.g., Houston v. State, 286 S.W.3d 604, 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Barker, 867

N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (111.
Ct. App. 2007).

81. State v. Williams, 858 So. 2d 878, 881 (La. Ct. App. 2003) ("Both the [driver] and the passenger
were guests in the third party's car. Both had mutual use of the car. There is no indication that the
defendant had exclusive control of the car or its contents.").
82. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006) ("We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a
shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot
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having completely equal rights in the residence.83 Obviously, the owner has
a greater property interest in the vehicle than the driver or any passengers,
and the owner's grant or denial of consent should therefore prevail. 84 The
driver and any passengers would likely have equal footing in conflicting
consent situation. 85 Moreover, it should be noted that the passenger may
have a serious hurdle to overcome regarding the issue of "standing" if86 he
seeks to challenge the admissibility of evidence seized from the vehicle.
An important consideration is the scope of consent. The consenting
individual may restrict "as he chooses the scope of the search to which he
consents. 8 7 If the individual does not restrict the scope of his consent, the
question becomes "what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect." 88
Generally, consent "extends to the entire area in which the object of the

be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.").
83. Id. at 114.
Unless the people living together fall within some recognized hierarchy, like a household
of parent and child or barracks housing military personnel of different grades, there is no
societal understanding of superior and inferior, a fact reflected in a standard formulation
of domestic property law, that "[e]ach cotenant . . . has the right to use and enjoy the
entire property as if he or she were the sole owner, limited only by the same right in the
other cotenants."
Id. (citation omitted).
84. See People v. Mendoza, 599 N.E.2d 1375, 1381 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (owner could have objected to
driver's grant of consent or limited the driver's authority over his property); Hill v. State, No. 05-0801224-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5352, at *2 3 (Tex. Ct. App. July 8, 2010) (driver of company truck
refused consent, and police called employer to obtain consent to search vehicle; police began search and
kept employer on the line so that he could revoke consent at any time). Although the law of property is
not controlling, property rights continue to influence Fourth Amendment analysis. See Randolph, 547
U.S. at 11. In addition, a lessor of the vehicle will be treated like the owner. Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 140-43 (1978).
85. In Williams, the Louisiana Court of Appeals went on to uphold the search of the automobile based
on the passenger's consent, even though the driver expressly refused consent. State v. Williams, 858 So.
2d, 878, 881 (La. Ct. App. 2003). Since neither the passenger nor the driver owned the vehicle, they had
equal rights in the car. Id. However the holding of Randolph would likely require a different result
today. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
86. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). The defendant in Rakas was a passenger in a vehicle
that was searched; he did not own the car nor the property seized from the car. Id. at 129. "'Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be
vicariously asserted."' Id. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).
Since the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched, his Fourth
Amendment rights were not infringed. Id. at 148. The Court went on to subsume the issue of
"standing" into the substantive Fourth Amendment analysis:
[T]he question is whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained
during it ....
[T]his aspect of the analysis belongs more properly under the heading of
substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing.
Id. at 140.
87. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991).
88. Id. at251.
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search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts
of entry or opening may be required to complete the search."8 9 Under this

test, the officer's search of a folded paper bag on the floorboard was upheld
as reasonable when the object of the search was drugs. 90 However, courts
have found the following actions to be unreasonable as exceeding the scope
of consent: (1) unscrewing a panel in the trunk, 9' (2) accessing the memory
of a cell phone,92 and (3) searching items that do not belong to the

individual who gave consent to search.93 General consent to search the
vehicle appears to be sufficient for the police to search any item that
belongs to that individual, so long as the container is not locked.94

As to the trunk, the officer will usually need the driver to open the trunk
with the key or with a button in the passenger compartment, thus giving
implied consent to the officer. The only other option would be for the
officer to order the driver out of the vehicle and push the trunk button

himself. A number of courts have distinguished giving "consent to search
the trunk" from general consent to search the car.95 In Schneckloth, the

officer received general consent to search the car but then sought specific
consent regarding the trunk. 96 In another case, the officer received consent
97
to search the interior of the vehicle but was denied consent as to the trunk.

Drivers are most likely unaware of their ability to limit the extent of the
search. However, the same justifications for giving consent (i.e., nothing to
hide or fear of appearing guilty) 98 still resurface in the area of limiting
consent.

As to time limitations, the driver's failure to object to the duration of a
89. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 21 (1982).
90. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249-50.
91. People v. Cantor, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478, 480-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
92. Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338, 343-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
93. See People v. Stage, 7 Cal. App. 3d 681, 682 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (passenger's jacket); State v.
Williams, 616 P.2d 1178, 1178-79 (Or. 1980) (passenger's cassette tape); United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d
383, 389 91 (5th Cir. 1996) (passenger's suitcase in trunk).
94. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52 (finding it "very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by
consenting to the search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the
trunk").
95. See id. at 252; see also United States v. Hammons, 152 F.3d 1025, 1027 (8th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Stribling, 94 F.3d 321, 322-23 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding written consent to search trunk);
United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1985) (driver denied consent to search trunk);
Gurleski v United States, 405 F.2d 253, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1968) (owner's mistress consented to search of
trunk).
96. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220 (1973).
97. See People v. Martinez, 65 Cal. Rptr. 920, 944 (1968) (holding defendant was within his rights to
revoke consent after initially agreeing to search of trunk but later insisting officer stop).
98. See supra notes 23 25 and accompanying text.
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consent search makes the continued search reasonable. 99 Thus, consent
searches of vehicles that last thirty minutes, or even an hour, have been
upheld as reasonable where the driver did not object to the length of time
involved. 100 In one of the more extreme set of facts, the Tenth Circuit
upheld a consent search of the vehicle in which the officer originally
conducted a one-hour search, but after the driver consented to meeting
another officer at a new location, a second search continued for an
additional hour.' 0' The court reasoned that the grant of consent did not
contain a durational limitation, and the driver never objected.10 2 In short,
the driver has the right to object to the duration of the consent search, and it
appears that he must object for the search to be considered unreasonable
because of the time involved.
What if there is something illegal found in the car? In Maryland v.
Pringle, the officer had probable cause to arrest all three occupants of the
vehicle at 3:16 a.m. where $763 of rolled-up cash was found in the glove
compartment and five plastic bags of cocaine were located behind the
armrest - thus accessible to all three occupants. 103 Under Pringle, the
officer will likely have probable cause to arrest any occupant of the vehicle
when he finds something illegal in the car; 0the
officer is not required to
4
conclusively establish ownership of the item.1
Another significant concern is the possibility of planted evidence. The
issue is raised in dozens of cases each year, but very rarely do these
accusations show any merit. However, some officers have planted evidence
in order to generate a conviction. °5 Once consent is given, it is a
possibility (though admittedly a rather remote one) that the office could
plant evidence, most likely drugs, and then "find" the evidence during the
search of the vehicle.

99. See, e.g., United States v. Alcantar, 271 F.3d 731, 738 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.
Gleason, 25 F.3d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1994)).
100. See id. (one-hour search upheld); see also United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 868-69
(8th Cir. 2010) (thirty-minute search upheld).
101. United States v. Carbaial-Iriarte, 586 F.3d 795, 802 (10th Cir. 2009).
102. Id.
103. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-72 (2003).
104. Of course, a defendant could attempt to distinguish Pringle if he did not have access to the item.
In addition, a passenger in a larger vehicle would have a legitimate argument that Pringle should not be
extended to situations involving more than three individuals.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Epley, 52 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 1995) (two officers convicted for planting
drugs and guns).
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PROTECTING THE DRIVER'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS REGARDING
CONSENT

Unfortunately, there are very few options available to remedy this loselose situation and protect the driver's Fourth Amendment rights. One
possibility is a voluntary change in police protocol.
Since police
procedures are generally determined on the local level, this would require a
large number of independent decisions. Police departments are unlikely to
reduce their dependence on consent searches because consent is so willingly
granted in most cases and because consent searches can be conducted
without the burden of obtaining a warrant.
A. Independent State Grounds
A few states have already afforded drivers increased protection regarding
consent through decisions based on state constitutional grounds. 16 In State
v. Johnson, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that while
Schneckloth is controlling on state courts insofar as
application of the Fourth Amendment is concerned and
defendant's federal constitutional argument[,]... each state
impose higher standards on searches07 and seizures under
required by the Federal Constitution. 1

construction and
is dispositive of
has the power to
state law than is

The Johnson Court held that "[u]nless it is shown by the State that the
person involved knew that he had the right to refuse to accede to such a
request, his assenting to the search is not meaningful," because the driver
"cannot be held to have waived a right if he was unaware of its
'
existence. "108
New Jersey has gone even further, later holding that "unless
there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor
vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic
stop, any further detention to effectuate a consent search is
unconstitutional."' 0 9
In 1983, Mississippi appeared to join New Jersey in requiring a knowing
waiver for consent in Penick v. State. 110 The Mississippi Supreme Court
held that "in order for there to be a valid waiver of the Constitutional right
106. Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The Troubled Jurisprudence
of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1,34-36(2001).
107. State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67 (N.J. 1975).

108. Id. at 68. For general rule that constitutional rights must be knowingly waived, see supra notes
15-17 and accompanying text.
109. State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 912 (N.J. 2002).
110. Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1983).
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against an illegal search, [it is] necessary that the person searched be aware
of his right under the law to refuse." ' No matter how the United States
Supreme Court might rule, the state's highest court must maintain "the sole
and absolute right to make the final interpretation" of its own
constitution.' 12 The Penick Court even had some colorful language
describing its willingness to depart from the Schneckloth standard:
The words of our Mississippi Constitution are not balloons to be blown up or
deflated every time, and precisely in accord with the interpretation the U.S.
Supreme Court, following some tortuous trail, is constrained to place upon
similar words in the U.S. Constitution. Putting the matter another way.
although the sheet music might appear the same, in reading the musical score of
our Mississippi Constitution we are not required to play the same tune the U.S.
Supreme Court
113 may play in its rendition from the musical score of the U.S.
Constitution.

A mere eight years later, the Penick decision was limited to only the
114
situations "where the consenter is impaired or has diminished capacity.''
In all other circumstances, Mississippi courts would "apply the same test
for valid consent as the federal standard and place the burden on the
defendant to show impaired consent or some diminished capacity. 1 1 5 In
short, the prosecution was no longer required to demonstrate the
defendant's knowledge of his right to refuse consent.1 6 Surprisingly, the
pendulum swung back towards individual liberties, at least slightly, when
the Mississippi Supreme Court later held that the defendant may prevail7
upon a showing that his waiver of consent was not knowingly made.1
Under current Mississippi law, the accused may raise lack of knowledge
about the right to refuse consent as an affirmative defense.
In Minnesota, the prosecution's claim of voluntary consent in the routine
traffic stop context is subject to "careful appellate review" due to the ability
to pull over virtually anyone, the "enormous discretion in enforcing traffic

111. Id. at 550.
112. Id. at 551.
113. Id. at 552.
114. Jones v. State, 607 So. 2d 23, 28 (Miss. 1991).
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220 (1973)).
117. Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858, 863-64 (Miss. 1998). Although "the State has no initial burden to
demonstrate knowledgeable waiver," the defendant can raise the issue and may claim that his waiver of
consent was not knowingly made. Id. at 864.
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laws," and the inherently coercive nature of a traffic stop.'"
In South
Dakota, the state must prove the voluntariness of consent by clear and
convincing evidence. 119
B. Overrule Schneckloth
Although it is unlikely to happen, the United States Supreme Court could

simply overturn Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court set forth the general
standard for overruling its prior precedent:

Even when the decision to overrule a prior case is not, as in the rare, latter
instance, virtually foreordained, it is common wisdom that the rule of stare
decisis is not an "inexorable command," and certainly it is not such in every
constitutional case. Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding. its
judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision
with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of
reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost
of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to
have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine or
whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification. 120

A legitimate argument could be made that "related principles of law have
so far developed" in cases such as Arizona v. Gant and that "facts have so
changed, or come to be seen
so differently" based on the vast usage of
121
searches.
consent
automobile
Some intriguing language can be found in the recent case of Arizona v.
Gant that could eventually lead to a reversal of Schneckloth. After
numerous opinions indicated a reduced expectation of privacy in the
automobile, 22 the Supreme Court stated that an individual's privacy and
118.
119.
120.
121.

State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579-80 (Minn. 1997).
State v. Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d 477, 478 (S.D. 1991).
505 U.S. 833, 854 55 (1992) (citations omitted).
For a thoughtful look at the likely grounds for such a reversal, see Arnold H. Loewy, Knowing

"Consent" Means

"Knowing Consent": The Underappreciated Wisdom of Justice Marshall's

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Dissent, 79 Miss. L. J. 97 (2010) (focusing on the dissent itself rather than
arguing for reversal).
122. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (noting the "the diminished expectation of
privacy in an automobile" and upholding inventory search); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114
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liberty interests in his vehicle are "important and deserving of constitutional
protection.' 2 3 In Gant, the Court prohibited searches of the entire vehicle
incident to arrest when there is no threat to officer safety and no possibility
of finding evidence related to the arresting offense.1 24 Such a search
"creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless
individuals" and "implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth
Amendment - the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion
to rummage at will among a person's private effects."'125 It remains to be
seen how far the Court will extend this logic to protect drivers and
passengers in the automobile consent search context.
VI. CONCLUSION

The driver is placed in a lose-lose situation when the officer seeks
consent to search the vehicle following a routine traffic stop. Schneckloth
held that the officer does not have to inform the driver of his ability to
refuse consent. 26 If the driver gives consent, the officer may search any
part of the vehicle in which the item sought could be located. Since police
officers often seek consent to search for narcotics, consensual searches
allow the officer to examine almost the entire vehicle, including a paper bag
on the floorboard. If the driver does not object to the length of the search,
the officer can continue the search indefinitely, even up to two hours. The
driver will always be delayed, and the officer will have probable cause to
arrest all occupants of the vehicle if he finds any incriminating evidence.
If the driver refuses to give consent, the officer is more likely to exercise
his discretion in certain areas. For example, the officer can call in a drug
dog without reasonable suspicion because a dog sniff is not considered a
search. Further, the officer may engage in further questioning of the driver
regarding the underlying offense, as well as general topics unrelated to the
offense. Most importantly, the officer does not violate the Fourth
Amendment when he arrests the driver for any traffic offense. This is true
regardless of the severity of the offense, such as driving just slightly over
the speed limit, and regardless of whether a state statute forbids the officer
to make such an arrest.

(1986) (driver has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle identification number, "VIN", and
thus examination of the VIN does not constitute search).
123. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Schneckloth v.Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220 (1973).
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There are few options available to remedy this lose-lose situation. Police
departments are unlikely to voluntarily relinquish their vast authority
related to consent searches.
Although states could offer additional
protection by requiring a knowing waiver of consent or insisting that the
prosecution prove the voluntariness of consent by a high standard, few
states have chosen to do so. Finally, the Supreme Court offered a glimmer
27
of hope in Arizona v. Gant that it may one day overturn Schneckloth.1
Until more states choose to offer greater protection or the Supreme Court
opts to reverse the Schneckloth decision, drivers and passengers will remain
in a lose-lose situation when it comes to consent searches of the vehicle.

127. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720.

